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PERFORMANCE IMPLICATION OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION: EVIDENCE FROM SRI LANKAN 
FIRMS 
 
Athula Manawaduge, Dr. Anura De Zoysa and Dr. Kathy Rudkin 





Purpose - This paper seeks to examine the impact of ownership concentration 
and ownership structure on firms’ performance of a sample of public listed 
companies in Sri Lanka in the premise of an agency theory framework. 
Design/methodology/approach - The paper first investigates the nature of 
ownership structure and concentration and then examines whether there is 
strong evidence to support the observation that the variations of ownership 
structure across firms result in systematic variations in firm performance. This 
hypothesis is tested by assessing the impact of ownership structure and 
concentration on firm performance measured in terms of accounting 
profitability and market performance using data for 45 Sri Lankan listed 
companies. 
Findings – The main finding indicates that there is a significant relationship 
between ownership concentration (SH10) and the performance of Sri Lankan 
companies measured in terms of an accounting performance measure of Return 
on Assets (ROA). However, no significant relationship was found between the 
Herfindahl index (HERF), which is a measure of ownership concentration, and 
any of the performance measures tested in the study. The insignificance of the 
HERF suggests that there could be a nonlinear relationship between ownership 
concentration and a firm’s performance. This study also did not find a 
relationship between market-based performance measures of companies and 
ownership concentration or the ownership structure of the Sri Lankan 
companies. This finding suggests the existence of market anomalies common 
to most of the emerging markets.     
 
Keywords: corporate ownership, ownership concentration, corporate governance, 




Effective corporate governance is of importance to any country because of its direct influence 
on economic development. Hence, designing corporate governance mechanisms for effective 
decision-making is paramount. The concept of corporate governance covers large number of 
distinct economic relations. One such relation is corporate ownership structure and its 
influence on corporate performance which is the main focus of this paper. Much of the 
literature on the governance of modern corporate entities is based on the assumption that the 
corporate ownership is widely dispersed where the ownership and control is separated 




This notion originally derives from Berle and Means (1932) and has been much propagated 
after the seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, recent literature shows a 
high level of ownership concentration in corporate entities in many developed and developing 
countries especially outside the Anglo-Saxon countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta 
et al., 1999). It is therefore important to examine the impact of ownership structure and 
concentration on a firm’s performance in this context. Theoretically, it can be argued that the 
ownership concentration may improve performance by decreasing monitoring costs or 
decline due to the possibility that large shareholders use their control rights to achieve private 
benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  
 
Performance implications of ownership concentration have been examined empirically by 
various researchers and have produced mixed results. For example Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
find no effect of ownership concentration on accounting profit whereas Leech and Leahy 
(1991) find a negative relationship between the ownership concentration and firm’s value and 
profitability. On the other hand, Zeitun and Gary (2007) find significant positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and the accounting performance measure of return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) and Morck et al. (1988) find a non-linear 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance in their examination of 
examining Fortune 500 firms for the year 1980. However, most research on ownership 
concentration and performance has been conducted in developed countries. There is an 
increasing awareness that the theories originated based on the evidence collected on 
developed countries such as the USA and the UK may have limited applicability to emerging 
market due to the vast differences in political, socio-cultural and business contexts between 
the developed and developing countries.  
 
In general emerging markets have distinct political economic and institutional characteristics 
which limit the application of an empirical model originated in developed markets. Recent 
studies on corporate governance suggest that social, economic and cultural factors of a 
country affect corporate ownership structure which in turn impacts on a firm’s performance 
(Zeitun and Gary, 2007). Due to historical and economic reasons, Sri Lankan companies’ 
governance structure and practices are very much influenced by neo-liberal reinforcement of 
good governance practices (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2004). However, the 
ownership structure of Sri Lankan companies is characterized by the controlling shareholder 
usually being another corporate entity; wide prevalence of family ownership as the ultimate 
owners; extensive use of a pyramid ownership structure, cross-holdings and participation in 
management by controlling shareholders to enhance corporate control; and an absence of a 
large community of arms-length institutional shareholders (Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2007). 
Corporate control is therefore often in the hands of a few individuals, families or corporate 
groups who hold the majority of ownership. These features have created a unique business 
environment which is vastly different to that found in developed countries.  
 
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and ownership concentration on 
firms’ performance of a sample of public listed companies in Sri Lanka in the premise of an 
agency theory framework. This paper is motivated by the lack of evidence about the 
relationship between corporate structure and firm performance in Sri Lankan firms. 
Samarakoon (1999) examined the ownership structure of companies listed on the Colombo 
Stock Exchange (CSE) and found that the ownership of these companies is highly 
concentrated, with a controlling shareholder in most companies. The existing governance 
structure of Sri Lankan companies being dominated by controlling shareholders, shows some 
similarity to the inside systems corporate governance model. However, whether there is an 
3 
 
impact from the presence of controlling shareholders’ participation in corporate management 
on firm performance is the question examined in this study.. Hence, this study examines 
whether agency theory is equally valid for explaining the relationship between performance 
and ownership structure in the developing economy of Sri Lanka. 
 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief review of the 
existing literature on the effects of ownership structure and concentration on firms’ 
performance. Section three explains the data and variables selection methods employed for 
the study. The empirical analysis and results are presented in the fourth section. Section five 
concludes the discussion. 
 
Literature review  
 
Governance issues arise when ownership of a legal entity is separated from its management 
(Tricker, 2000). This intensifies the need to search for good governance practices, as 
identified by Berle and Means (1932). Central to this analysis is agency theory which 
explains the conflict of interest between inside owners and outside shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that relative to the amount of ownership 
held by insiders, managers are provided with incentives to pursue activities to serve their own 
benefits, which in turn are aligned also to enhance the firm value. According to their 
hypothesis, both a firm’s value and its performance increase with the level of insider 
ownership. 
 
The market centric economies are largely characterized by the existence of a widely held 
ownership structure, highly liquid stock markets due to good investor protection and control 
of companies by professional managers on behalf of scattered shareholders (Bhasa2004). In 
these economies, corporate management has more power to make decisions, and these 
decisions may frequently be in their own interest, which may give rise to an agency cost. 
Agency theory argues that ownership concentration may improve firm performance by 
decreasing agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that 
agency costs consist of three different components: monitoring costs, bonding costs and 
residual loss. Monitoring costs are the control costs incurred by the principal to mitigate the 
devious behavior of the manager. Bonding costs are incurred to ensure that the manager takes 
decisions beneficial to the principal. Residual loss is a political cost that occurs when both the 
above kind of costs fails to control the divergent behavior of the manager. Further, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) showed formally how the allocation of shares among insiders and 
outsiders can influence the agency cost and value of the firm. Since then, the relationship 
between ownership and firm performance has attracted special attention. Agency theory 
perspective and empirical literature thereof usually considers insider ownership as the main 
corporate mechanism that affects firm value. However, empirical evidence regarding the 
relationship between ownership concentration and the financial performance or firm’s value 
has shown mix results (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; 
Thomsen et al., 2006). Despite the wealth of research the question whether a large number of 
owners, or a concentration of ownership, contributes to reduced agency costs, thereby 
improving the firm value and financial performance remains unanswered.  
 
The agency theory hypothesis that ownership concentration may improve firm performance 
by decreasing agency costs was first challenged by Demsets (1983), who argues that the 
ownership structure of a corporation should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of 
decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders. According to Demsetz (1983), there 
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should be no systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and variations in 
firm performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide evidence of the endogeneity of a firm’s 
ownership structure. They used a measure of the profit rate on a fraction of shares owned by 
the five largest shareholding interests and found no evidence of any relation between the 
profit rate and the ownership concentration. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show the 
importance of the role played by large shareholders, and how the price of a firm’s shares 
increases as the proportion of shares held by large shareholders rises. They argue 
theoretically for a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. 
 
In a seminal study, Morck et al. (1988) ignored the endogeneity issue altogether and re-
examined the relation between corporate ownership structure and performance measured in 
terms of Tobin’s Q and proposed a non-linear relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance. They found a positive relationship between corporate ownership structure 
and Tobin’s Q for less than 5 per cent board ownership range, a negative relationship 
between 5 per cent to 25 per cent range and a positive relationship for ownership exceeding 
25 per cent. However their results are not supported with accounting based performance 
measures. Wu and Cui (2002) found that there is a positive relation between ownership 
concentration and accounting profits, indicated by return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE), but the relation is negative with respect to the market value measured by the 
share price-earning ratio (P/E) and market price to book value ratio (M/B). 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms vary around the world and can produce different 
ownership effects on firms’ performance. Corporate governance literature identifies the 
existence of four different models of governance viz., outsider system (market-centric model) 
insider system (relationship-based model), transition model and emerging governance model. 
These models are widely different in terms of how those associated are accountable in the 
process of the separation of ownership and control within the organization (Bhasa, 2004). In 
countries such as USA and UK where market-centric mechanisms are in operation, firms 
substantially rely on the legal protection of investors and an ownership structure that is 
dispersed. In Europe and Japan where relationship mechanism is in operation, there is less 
reliance on elaborate legal protections, and more reliance on large investors and banks. In the 
rest of the world, ownership is typically heavily concentrated in families, in which the legal 
protection is weaker than the other types of ownership. The market-centric and relationship-
based governance models have been widely discussed in governance literature providing 
evidence as to how the differences in economic characteristics bring about different 
governance practices with different performance efficiency. Nevertheless, emerging 
governance models have not been extensively examined. While an increasing body of 
literature has referred to the potential differences in economic characteristics of developing 
counties, much less discussion is available in respect of the corporate structure, governance 
practices and their influence on performance of the firm. 
 
Corporate governance issues are extensively examined under various theoretical perspectives 
such as the agency, stewardship, stakeholder and the political models. These theoretical 
perspectives provide different viewpoints to investigate firms and their governance (Turnbull, 
1997). However, the dominant focus in mainstream literature has been from an agency 
perspective of the firm with a view to securing owners’ interests by reducing agency cost. 
Most of these theories are developed and examined in the developed economies assuming 
contextual conditions of these economies provide universal reference. Tricker (cited in 
Turnbull, 1997) states “stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and agency theory are all 
essentially ethnocentric. Although the underlying ideological paradigms are seldom 
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articulated, the essential ideas are derived from Western thought, with its perceptions and 
expectations of the respective roles of individual, enterprise and the state and of the 
relationships between them.” An increasing body of literature has referred to the potential 
differences in economic characteristics of developing countries. However, interaction of these 
economic characteristics with governance and corporate structures and performance 
implications of these factors have not been examined extensively even though the empirical 
studies on ownership structure on firms’ performance, mostly from developed countries, have 
provided divergent evidence. These contextual differences across countries therefore, create 
another dimension to the ownership structure and performance issue. In an attempt to 
reconcile this divergent evidence, Udayasankar and Das (2007) notionally explained the 
performance implication of corporate governance in the context of the exogenous 
environment supported with multiple theories of corporate governance such as agency, 
stakeholder, resource-dependence, and institutional theories and created an argument that the 
regulation and competitive forces in the environment interact with the governance practices 
of firms, resulting in idiosyncratic effects on performance. 
 
Because of the contextual differences across countries, different relations between ownership 
and firm value could be expected. For example, in emerging economies, where firm 
ownership is highly concentrated with family ownership, a positive and significant effect of 
ownership concentration on firm performance is proposed. This argument is confirmed by the 
study of Zeitun and Gary (2007). They examine the relationship of ownership concentration, 
and firm performance both in term of accounting measures and market measures using a 
sample of public listed companies in the Jordan stock exchange, and found that there is a 
significant relation between ownership concentration and the accounting performance 
measures. Abor and Biekpe (2007) investigated whether the effects of corporate governance 
and ownership structure on the performance of SME’s in Ghana. They find that board size, 
board composition, CEO duality, inside ownership and family ownership have significant 
positive impacts on profitability.  
 
In spite of all these efforts to investigate the effect of ownership structure on firms’ 
performance until now there are few studies which analyze the ownership structure and its 
main characteristics, but there is no study to the effect of ownership structure on firms’ 
performance on Sri Lanka companies.  
 




The data used in this study included 45 publicly listed companies on the Colombo Stock 
Exchange (CSE) for the year 2007/2008. These companies are selected randomly covering 
fourteen different industrial sectors out of twenty industrial sectors represented in the CSE. 
The sectors represented include Beverage Food & Tobacco, Chemical, Diversified, Heath 
Care, Hotel & Travel, Investment Trust, Land & Property, Manufacturing, Motors, 
Plantation, Power & Energy, Services, Telecommunications and Trading. However, the 
Banking, Finance and Insurance sector is excluded from the initial sample selection process 
since applicable regulation for this sector especially in respect of share ownership; 
profitability measures and liquidity assessment are vastly different from the firms in the other 
industrial sectors. The major items of interest are balance sheets, income statements, 
ownership structure, and the percentage holdings of all main shareholders. As per the listing 
rules of the CSE, all listed companies should prepare financial statements based on the Sri 
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Lanka Accounting Standards which are adopted from International Accounting Standards. 
Furthermore, information in respect of distribution of shares, composition of shareholders in 
terms of institutional and individual and the shareholding of twenty major shareholders has to 
be disclosed in the annual reports. Table 1 presents the profile of companies in the sample.  
 
                
  Total Assets    Sales    
  Rs. Millions Frequency %  Rs. Millions Frequency %  
   0-100  7 16%  0-25 4 9%  
   101-500  8 18%  26-100 11 24%  
   501-1000  11 24%  101-1000 16 36%  
   1001-5000  12 27%  1001-2500 7 16%  
   5001-10000  5 11%  2501-10000 5 11%  
   >10000  2 4%  >10000 2 4%  
    45 100%    45 100%  
  Descriptive statistics Rs. Millions  Descriptive statistics Rs. Millions  
  Mean       3,883   Mean      1,851   
  Standard Deviation      11,248   Standard Deviation      4,949   
  Minimum          8   Minimum         4   
  Maximum      69,907   Maximum     31,129   
          
  Age    ROA    
  Years Frequency %  Per cent Frequency %  
   0-5  1 2%  <1 8 18%  
   6-15  3 7%  1-2.5 5 11%  
   16-30  21 47%  2.5-7.5 16 36%  
   31-50  8 18%  7.5-15 11 24%  
   51-100  11 24%  20 3 7%  
   >100  1 2%  >20 2 4%  
    45 100%    45 100%  
  Descriptive statistics Years  Descriptive statistics Per cent  
  Mean 36  Mean 6.68  
  Standard Deviation 25  Standard Deviation 6.73  
  Minimum 5  Minimum -4.60  
  Maximum 164  Maximum 27.80  
                
Table 1: Profile of the Companies in the Sample 
 
As shown in Table 1, there is a significant dispersion between the size of sample companies 
measured by either total assets or the sales. The total assets of sample companies ranged from 
8 million rupees to 69,907 millions, showing a massive disparity. While the average total 
assets of companies amounted to 3,883 million rupees, the total assets of the majority of 
companies (58%) were less than 1,000 million rupees. A similar situation is observed when 
the size of the companies is measured in terms of sales, which varied from 4 million rupees to 
31,129 million rupees between companies, also showing a huge disparity between sample 
companies in terms of sales. The sample companies consisted of both young and old 
companies with the age of companies ranging from 5 to 164 years. The majority of 
companies in the sample (56%) were less than 30 years old and 74 per cent of companies 
were less than 50 years old. As for the profitability level of companies, once again there was 
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a wide disparity. While 41 companies in the sample were profitable, the remaining 4 
companies were earning negative returns on their assets in the year 2008. The average 
profitability ratio of the sample companies in 2008 was 6.7% while the majority of 




Return on assets (ROA) is used as an accounting performance measure while Tobin’s Q (TQ) 
and market-to-book value ratio (MBR) are employed as the market performance measures of 
firms. These performance variables represent the dependent variables used separately in the 
regression model. The concentration ratios, ownership fraction ratio, and other control 
variables are used as explanatory variables.  
 
To determine the ownership concentration initially five variables have been constructed 
namely the percentage held by the largest shareholder (SH1), the percentage held by two 
largest shareholders (SH2), the percentage held by first three largest shareholders (SH3) the 
percentage held by first five largest shareholders (SH5) and the percentage held by first ten 
largest shareholders (SH10). Further, the Herfindahl Index (HERF) of ownership 
concentration i.e. the sum of squared percentage of shares controlled by each top five 
shareholders is also used as a concentration variable. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics 
for the concentration variable for the sample. All concentration ratios indicate that ownership 
is highly concentrated. The average of largest shareholder’s ownership is 44 per cent whereas 
first ten largest shareholders’ ownership average is as high as 80 percent. The data also reveal 
that there is a substantial variation across firms in ownership concentration. Despite the high 
average, the largest owner’s ownership varies between 10 per cent and 83 per cent. The 
average value of median of largest shareholder’s ownership in France and Spain is 20 and 34 
per cent respectively (Becht and Roell, 1999). The range of median in Sri Lankan firms is 
considerably high by this standard.  
 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum
SH1 44.24 21.21 10.57 47.00 83.15
SH2 57.04 19.82 20.70 57.75 92.01
SH3 63.62 17.74 25.27 64.86 93.91
SH5 71.14 15.19 30.27 70.65 95.99
SH10 79.35 12.06 41.49 81.03 100.00
HERF 2724.70 1823.77 270.97 2537.82 6923.55
Table 2: Ownership Concentration Variables 
 
Variable  SH1 SH2 SH3 SH5 SH10 HERF 
SH1 1           
SH2 0.934145 1         
SH3 0.884755 0.980014 1       
SH5 0.778855 0.8903 0.953456 1     
SH10 0.564655 0.684845 0.781763 0.91311 1   
HERF 0.976334 0.927397 0.891786 0.806802 0.623622 1
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Concentration Variables 
 
To determine the appropriate concentration variables for the regression model, the correlation 
coefficient matrix of the variables has been constructed as presented in Table 3. After 
eliminating highly correlated variables, SH10 and HERF index are used as indictors of 
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ownership concentration to investigate whether ownership concentration increased firms’ 
performance. 
 
Most of the studies about the relation between ownership structure and firm performance 
used managerial ownership as the measure of ownership structure. However, the ownership 
structure of Sri Lankan companies is characterized by peculiar features such as the 
controlling shareholder is usually another corporate entity; wide prevalence of family 
ownership as the ultimate owners; extensive use of a pyramid ownership structure and cross-
holdings (Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2007). In this sample 38 of the companies have another 
company as its major shareholder. Further, very high percentage of shares is owned by 
institutional investors. These shareholders are different in their interests in the firm and their 
incentives and ability to monitor the firm. To determine whether there is an influence of this 
ownership structure on firm performance two fraction ratios (F) i.e. the fraction of shares 
owned by other institutions (F-Com), and the fraction owned by individuals (F-Ind) are 
constructed. Table 4 present descriptive statistics for the fraction variables for the sample. An 
important question addressed in this study is whether ownership structure has an impact on 
performance.  
 
 Variable Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum
Percentage of shares owned by another 
institutions (F-Com) 68.64 23.90 11.59 73.76 99.99
Percentage of shares owned by 
individuals (F-Ind) 31.36 23.90 0.01 26.24 88.41
Table 4: Ownership Structure 
 
Factors other than ownership structure may also affect a firm’s performance. To take them 
into account, a set of control variables have been incorporated into the regression model. 
These control variables include total assets (T-Ast), total sales (TS), firm age (Age), total 
debt to total asset (TD/TA) and total debt to total equity ratio (TD/TE). The relationship 
between variables is estimated using regression analysis.  
 
Analysis and results 
 
This study examines the relationship between variations in ownership concentration variables 
and ownership structure variables, and the firms’ performance. The hypothesis tested is that 
ownership concentration does affect the firm’s performance positively.  
The estimated equation to test the hypothesis is as follows.  
 
Y = β0 + β1 (SH10) + β2 Log (Sales) + β3 Log (Age) + β4 (TD/TA) + β5 (F) + e (1) 
 
where Y is alternatively ROA, TQ, and MBR for firm i as a measure of performance. The 
independent variables are represented by the concentration ratio (SH), ownership fraction 
ratio (F), log sales, log age and TD/TA ratio. Only SH10 and the HERF are used as 
concentration ratios in the estimation to investigate the effect ownership concentrations on 
firm’s performance. F is alternatively F-Com and F-Ind where as e is an error term.  
 
The results of the regression are reported in Table 5 where SH10 is used for the ownership 
concentration. Table 6 presents the regression results where HERF is used for the ownership 
concentration. The SH10 variables were found to have a positive and significant impact on 
ROA at least at a 5 percent level of significance for various equations as indicated in Table 5. 
9 
 
However, the estimated coefficient of HERF has no impact on ROA. Neither the HERF nor 
the SH10 have any explanatory power for both Q and MBR.  
 
Vari
able   
Consta
nt SH10 Sales Age 
TD/T
A F-Ind F-Com R2 
Adj. 
R2 
ROA Coefficient (13.82) 0.18 2.43 (3.40) (9.19) 0.05  0.25 0.15 
  t-Statistic (1.25) 1.79* 2.05** (0.93) 
(1.92)
* 0.93     
ROA Coefficient (9.19) 0.18 2.43 (3.40) (9.19)  (0.05) 0.25 0.15 
  t-Statistic (0.98) 1.79* 2.05** (0.93) 
(1.92)
*  (0.93)    
TQ Coefficient 20.46  (0.05) (4.25) 4.37 14.89 (0.04)  0.09 (0.03)
  t-Statistic 0.78  (0.23) (1.52) 0.50 1.32 (0.34)     
TQ Coefficient 16.41  (0.05) (4.25) 4.37 14.89  0.04  0.09 (0.03)
  t-Statistic 0.74  (0.23) (1.52) 0.50 1.32  0.34     
MBR Coefficient 43.48  (0.10) (9.70) 9.93 34.12 (0.09)  0.09 (0.02)
  t-Statistic 0.74  (0.19) (1.54) 0.51 1.34 (0.34)     
MBR Coefficient 34.50  (0.10) (9.70) 9.93 34.12  0.09  0.09 (0.02)
  t-Statistic 0.69  (0.19) (1.54) 0.51 1.34   0.34      
Note: ***, **, * indicate significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. 
Table 5: Ownership Concentration (SH10), Structure and Firm’s Performance 
 
Vari











ROA Coefficient (0.83) 0.00  2.74  (2.97) (9.22) (0.00)  0.18  0.08  
  t-Statistic (0.09) 0.05  
2.15*
*  (0.78) 
(1.85)
* (0.04)     
ROA Coefficient (1.04) 0.00  2.74  (2.97) (9.22)  0.00  0.18  0.08  
  t-Statistic (0.12) 0.05  
2.15*
*  (0.78) 
(1.85)
*  0.04     
TQ Coefficient 18.97  (0.00) (3.74) 3.75  15.29  (0.08)  0.10  (0.01) 
  t-Statistic 0.95  (0.71) (1.30) 0.43  1.36  (0.65)     
TQ Coefficient 10.73  (0.00) (3.74) 3.75  15.29   0.08  0.10  (0.01) 
  t-Statistic 0.54  (0.71) (1.30) 0.43  1.36   0.65     
MBR Coefficient 41.69  (0.00) (8.50) 8.56  35.03  (0.19)  0.10  (0.01) 
  t-Statistic 0.94  (0.72) (1.31) 0.44  1.39  (0.68)     
MBR Coefficient 22.60  (0.00) (8.50) 8.56  35.03   0.19  0.10  (0.01) 
  t-Statistic 0.50  (0.72) (1.31) 0.44  1.39    0.68      
Note: ***, **, * indicate significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. 
Table 6: Ownership Concentration (HERF), Structure and Firm’s Performance 
 
The significant impact of the concentration ratios on ROA is in support of the Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) hypothesis that concentrated ownership might reduce the agency cost, and 
hence increase the firm’s performance. These results are consistent with Zeitun and Gary 
(2007); that ROA and ROE are the most important factor used by investors rather than the 
market measure of performance. This finding is also consistent with the result of Wu and Cui 
(2002) that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and accounting 
profits measured in terms of ROA. The insignificant results of concentration variables in both 
Q and MBR equations could be due to inefficiency of the Sri Lankan equity market where 
company fundamentals are not impounded into share price efficiently. Further, this may be 
due to the incapability of capturing other types of inherent market anomalies which are 




In summary, empirical evidence suggests that ownership concentration has a positive effect 
on a firm’s performance. The positive effect of ownership concentration has a stronger effect 





This paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and concentration and 
firm performance for a sample of 45 Sri Lankan public companies listed on the CSE. This 
study provides useful information on the performance level and the impacts of ownership 
concentration on both accounting performance and market performance. This paper not only 
studies the relationship between ownership concentration and firm’s performance, but also 
investigates whether the ownership structure, measured in term of fraction of shares owned 
by institutions and fraction of shares owned by individuals has an effect on a firm’s 
performance.  
 
The paper produces significant and consistent results in respect of accounting performance. 
First, empirical findings indicate that there is a significant relation between ownership 
concentration (SH10) and the accounting performance measure ROA. Secondly, the HERF is 
not significant at any level of significance in any measure of performance. The insignificance 
of the HERF shows that there could be a nonlinear relationship between ownership 
concentration and a firm’s performance. Furthermore, ownership concentration or ownership 
structure did not show any effect on market based performance measures. This finding 
suggests the existence of market anomalies in Sri Lanka which are common to most of the 
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